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Climate change discourse by the British Ministry of Defence: The framing of the 2024 report

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Abstract

The current political discourse in the UK is characterised by a notable tendency to securitise the issue of climate change. Given that the British Ministry of Defence (further – the MoD) is responsible for the UK’s security, it is pivotal to shed light onto how the MoD frames the issue of climate change in its reports. Against this background, the present article introduces a study, which employs a qualitative framing analysis in order to examine the framing of climate change in the MoD’s report on climate change published in 2024. **The aim of the study** is to provide answers the following research question (RQ): How is the issue of climate change framed in the MoD’s 2024 report? In terms of the **methodology**, the study is based upon a qualitative framing approach to discourse (Entman, 1993). The application of the qualitative methodology to the report yielded the following results, which were manifested by eight different types of frames, namely Agility, Challenge, Costs, Future, Green Energy, Mitigation, Risk, and Technology. It was found that all of the aforementioned frames were discursively situated in the nexus between the issues of security and climate change. Judging from the findings, the MoD report framed the issue of climate change via the frames that were interrelated or, at least, were indicative of a clear connection between them, which allowed their classification into the following groups: (i) Challenge and Risk, (ii) Costs, Future, and Mitigation, and (iii) Technology and Green Energy. Concurrently, the frame Agility was found to be a stand-alone type of the framing of climate change. **Discussion**. The frames Challenge and Risk, (ii) Costs and Mitigation, and (iii) Technology and Green Energy were reflective of the literature, which reported the presence of similar frames in the British discourses on climate change. However, it was established that the frames Agility and Future could not be discussed in terms of their relationship to the literature on the grounds that they, and especially, the frame Agility, seemed to be a novel finding not previously mentioned in the prior studies. It could be **concluded** that the British MoD communicated the issue of climate change in an open access report that was framed in such a way that it seemed to be aligned with the respective frames by the consecutive British governments, such as the frames Challenge and Risk, Costs and Mitigation, and Technology and Green Energy.

Keywords: climate change discourse, the Ministry of Defence, framing, reports, securitisation, the UK

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Дискурс щодо зміни клімату від Міністерства оборони Великої Британії: фреймінг звіту за 2024 рік

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Анотація

Поточний політичний дискурс у Великій Британії характеризується помітною тенденцією до сек’юритизації питання зміни клімату. З огляду на те, що Міністерство оборони Великої Британії (далі – МО) відповідає за безпеку Великої Британії, важливо з’ясувати, як МО фреймує дискурс зміни клімату у своїх звітах. Тож ця стаття репрезентує дослідження, яке використовує фреймінг-аналіз, щоб вивчити фреймінг у звіті Міністерства оборони про зміну клімату, опублікованому у 2024 році. **Метою дослідження** є надання відповідей на таке дослідницьке запитання: як дискурс зміни клімату сфреймовано у звіті Міністерства оборони за 2024 рік? Щодо **методології**, то дослідження базується на методології фреймінгу (Entman, 1993). Унаслідок дослідження виокремлено вісім різних типів фреймів, що позв’язані з питаннями безпеки та зміни клімату. У звіті МО питання зміни клімату розв’язано з допомогою фреймів, які були взаємопов’язані або принаймні вказували на чіткий зв’язок між ними, що дозволило класифікувати їх на такі групи: (i) «виклик» і «ризик», (ii) «витрати», «майбутнє» і «пом’якшення наслідків» та (iii) «технології» й «зелена енергія». Визначено, що фрейм «спритність» є окремим типом фреймінгу зміни клімату. **Дискусія** результатів дослідження показує, що фрейми (i) «виклик» і «ризик», (ii) «витрати» і «пом’якшення наслідків» та (iii) «технології» й «зелена енергія» віддзеркалюють літературу, в якій повідомлено про наявність подібних фреймів у британських дискурсах щодо зміни клімату. Однак було встановлено, що фрейми «спритність» та «майбутнє» не можна обговорювати з точки зору їх зв’язку з літературою на тій підставі, що вони, а особливо фрейм «спритність», є новою знахідкою, про яку раніше не згадувалося в попередніх дослідженнях. З огляду на те, що питання безпеки та зміни клімату були в центрі кожного з вищезгаданих фреймів, можна зробити **висновок**, що британське МО донесло питання зміни клімату широкій громадськості та іншим зацікавленим сторонам у звіті відкритого доступу, який був сформульований так, що він узгоджувався з відповідними фреймами британських урядів, такими як «виклик» і «ризик», «витрати» й «пом’якшення наслідків» та «технології» й «зелена енергія».

Ключові слова: дискурс про зміну клімату, звіти, Міністерство оборони, сек’юритизація, фрейм

Introduction. The construal of change is a multifaceted phenomenon, which pertains to changes in human values, beliefs and ethics (Calman, 2004; Job, 2009; Kapranov, 2022), as well as changes in the environment and ecology, which are, inter alia, associated with the notion of anthropogenic climate change (Fløttum et al., 2014; Kumar et al., 2024). Change as a climate change-related phenomenon can be perceived and, literally, seen as an increase in temperature that leads to prolonged heat waves, floods, and storms (Nicholls & Kebede, 2012; Otto, 2020), which impact heavily upon a number of island nations, inclusive of the United Kingdom (the UK). Other manifestations of climate change involve food shortages, health-related concerns, mass migration, economic destabilisation, and armed conflicts (Bowles et al., 2015).

In this light, there is a strong tendency to view climate change as a national and international issue that poses a grave security threat (Warner & Boas, 2019). Given that the UK is massively exposed to the negative consequences of climate change, it is hardly surprising that the British government treats the issue of climate change seriously (Gillings & Dayrell, 2024). Moreover, there are multiple studies that argue that a number of British political actors, inclusive of the government and, in particular, the Ministry of Defence, present their discourses on climate change through the lens of national security, risk-management, and national preparedness for climate change-related emergency situations (Kapranov, 2018a, 2018b; Thomas, 2023). Accordingly, it seems pertinent to explore how the British Ministry of Defence frames its climate change discourse. In this regard, it should be mentioned that whereas research on the framing of climate change discourses in the UK is exceptionally well-documented (Kapranov, 2024a, 2024b; Nisbett et al., 2024), very little is known about the framing of climate change by the British Ministry of Defence (further in the article – MoD). The present study seeks to narrow the gap in scholarship by means of analysing a climate change report published by the MoD in 2024. The study employs a qualitative framing analysis that is developed by Entman (1993, 2007). According to Entman (1993), frames in discourse define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies-offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects. A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions, although many sentences in a text may perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four functions. (Entman, 1993, p. 52)

In unity with Entman's views on framing (1993, 2007), the study that is further presented in the article seeks to reply to the following research question (RQ): How is the issue of climate change framed in the MoD's 2024 report? Directed by the RQ, the article is structured as follows. First, an outline of the literature on the securitisation of climate change discourse in the UK is provided. Second, the present study is introduced in conjunction with the RQ, the specific research aim, the description of the MoD 2024 report on climate change, and the methodology of framing analysis. Third, the results of the study are illustrated and discussed. Finally, the study is summed up in conjunction with a range of possible research avenues that may arise from the study.

The securitisation of climate change discourse in the UK: An outline of the literature. Considering that the present study is concerned with the framing of climate change by the British MoD, it seems quite logical to provide the readers with an outline of prior research that looks into the nexus between the issue of climate change and security. Specifically, the literature outline focuses on a number of recent studies on the securitisation of climate change in a variety of discursive contexts in the UK. Before we proceed to the literature outline, however, let us specify the definition of securitisation. According to the canonical definition that is formulated by Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998), securitisation is operationalised as a security frame in which a certain issue is theorised and subsequently analysed as a matter of top security. In line with the aforementioned definition, the issue of climate change can be problematised as a security concern and "a grave global security threat, causing chaos, conflict and destabilising countries" (Warner & Boas, 2019, p. 1471).

There are multiple studies that show that the UK is considered a trend-setter in terms of viewing

and problematising the construal of securitisation in climate change discourses (Boas, 2015; Boas and Rothe, 2016; Warner & Boas, 2019). In this regard, Warner and Boas (2019) argue that the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has securitised its discourse on climate change. Specifically, the MFA has securitised its climate change discourse on the international arena, inclusive of the so-called environmental diplomacy (ibid.). Similarly, Kapranov (Kapranov, 2024b) reports that the reigning British monarch King Charles III resorts to the securitisation of climate change on the international scene. Particularly, he frames his climate change discourse via the frames Risk, Battle and Threat, thus problematising the issue of climate change as the cornerstone of his views on the matter (Kapranov, 2024b).

Furthermore, Kapranov (2018b, 2024a) has established that several British prime ministers both from the Conservative and Labour Parties frame their discourses on climate change through the lens of the frames that are associated with the securitisation of anthropogenic climate change. Specifically, these frames are construed as Economic Threat, Battle, and War. To be more precise, both the Conservative and Labour prime ministers employ the framing of climate change as a battle that needs to be won. Such framing is evocative of the framing of climate change by King Charles (2024b). Judging from the literature, we may argue that the British political leadership, irrespective of the political divide, seems to be in agreement on the framing of climate change as a security issue that structures its climate change discourses along the security lines.

Similarly, Matthews (2017) contends that the British media discourse on climate change involves the frames that are associated with different types of risk, both actual and potential, posed by the negative consequences of climate change, which should be combatted, or, in other words, fought. Notably, Matthews (Matthews 2017) has established that the aforementioned framing of climate change is present in the UK's traditional and reputable newspapers The Times, The Telegraph, The Independent, and The Guardian.

It is inferred from Matthews (Matthews 2017), Kapranov (Kapranov, 2018a, 2024a, 2024b), and Warner and Boas (2019) that the securitisation of the issue of climate change is mainly affiliated with the major political parties, the government, the King, and the mainstream media. The aforesaid political and media actors seem to have adopted the lens of securitisation of their climate change discourses (Harrington, 2023; Peters, 2018). At the same time, Chmutina, Fussey, Dainty, and Bosher (2018) demonstrate that the adoption or, rather, incorporation of securitisation into the respective climate change discourses in the UK appears quite graduate. Specifically, Chmutina, Fussey, Dainty, and Bosher (2018) argue that the re-framing of climate change from an environmental problem to the issue associated with security and the accompanying concerns that involve climate change-related natural hazards and disasters had been taking place in the UK between 1997 and 2017. According to Peters (2018) and, to an extent, Chmutina, Fussey, Dainty, and Bosher (2018), by the late 2010s the issue of climate change had firmly established itself in the British media discourse. Moreover, the framing of climate change as a multiple threat to the UK's national security seems to be dominant in the current British political discourse (Harrington, 2023). Thus, based upon the literature, we may argue that the securitisation of the framing of climate change can be regarded as a critical topic in the UK. As such, it pertains to the framing of climate change as (i) environmental security, (ii) individual human security, (iii) collective societal security, (iv) national security, and (v) international security (Boas, 2015; Boas & Rothe, 2016; Chmutina et al., 2018; Harrington, 2023; Kapranov, 2018b, 2024a, 2024b; Matthews, 2017; Peters, 2018; Warner & Boas, 2019).

As illustrated by the literature outline, the securitisation of the framing of climate change is profusely represented in the prior studies. However, as already mentioned in the introduction, there seems to be no published research on the securitisation of the issue of climate change by the British MoD. Further, in the subsequent section of the article, a qualitative study is presented that addresses this understudied aspect.

The present study: Research aims, corpus, and methodology. As mentioned, the present study is anchored in the qualitative framing methodology developed by Entman (Entman, 1993, 2007), who postulates that "frames introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, activating schemas that encourage target

audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way" (Entman, 2007, p. 164). Furthermore, Entman (Entman, 2007, p. 164) links framing to agenda-setting in media and political communication, which can be seen as a critical property of framing in terms of defining the problem at hand as an issue that is worthy of interest to the public at large and the government. Accordingly, it is contended that framing is a useful communicative tool in the exercise of political power (Entman, 2007; Kapranov, 2016a; Scheufele, 1999). Seen in this light, framing could be argued to form an essential element that is involved in climate change discourses (Ponton & Raimo, 2024) and, in particular, in the climate change discourse by such government body as the British MoD. Specifically, it can be contended that the MoD's framing of climate change discourse would be reflective of the MoD's discourse on security, both national and international. Based upon the prior research (see the preceding section of the article), it could be assumed that the MoD's climate change discourse could be framed via the construal of securitisation. This assumption seems to be quite logical, given that the MoD's discourse and communication deal, predominantly, with a broad range of security-related issues (Baylis, 2021), inclusive of climate change and its relation to the tasks and challenges that the MoD currently faces. Arguably, the MoD's stance on the issue of climate change and, particularly, the nexus between security and climate change would be manifested in the specialised climate change reports, which the MoD publishes yearly.

Mindful of the aforementioned considerations, the RQ is formulated in the study (see the introductory part of the article). Guided by the RQ, the study aims at analysing the framing of climate change discourse in the report titled "Corporate Report. Defence: Sustainability as a Competitive Advantage" (further in the article – the report), which was published by the MoD's in 2024. The report is freely available at the webpage https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-sustainability-as-a-competitive-advantage. Below, Table 1 summarises the report and provides its brief descriptive statistics.

Table 1. The Descriptive Statistics of the Report

#	**Reports' details**	**Description**
1	Availability	Freely available in both HTML and pdf formats at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-sustainability-as-a-competitive-advantage
2	Full title	Corporate report. Defence: Sustainability as a Competitive Advantage
3	Publication date	3 October 2024, updated 11 October 2024
4	Brief description	The report summarises how the defence sector can conquer affordability or incentivisation issues affecting the uptake of scientific and technological solutions typically described as 'Climate Change and Sustainability' (CC&S) products.
5	Report's sections	1. Executive summary 2. Introduction 3. The roundtables and methodology 4. Infrastructure 5. Platforms and equipment 6. Next steps and opportunities 7. Conclusions 8. Case studies: Infrastructure 9. Case studies: Capabilities 10. Appendix 1: Roundtable series delivery team and participants
6	Number of pages and words	47 pages in the pdf file, 11 195 words in total

Now, it seems that the reason for choosing the report as the basis of the present investigation should be clarified in more detail. First of all, yearly reports represent a standard way of communication

with the public at large and stakeholders in the UK's corporate and government discourses (Kapranov, 2016c), inclusive of communication associated with the issue of climate change (Kapranov, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b; Russill & Nyssa, 2009). The yearly reports on climate change by the MoD are no exception. Second, the report is public and is freely available for downloading, reading by the general public, and using for research purposes. Third, there are multiple studies on the framing of climate change reports that focus on one or maximum two issues of yearly reports (Fløttum & Dahl, 2012). In this regard, for instance, it is worth mentioning the studies conducted by Fløttum and Gjerstad (2013), who examine climate policy as a case study of the climate change report "National Climate Change Response" published in South Africa in 2018 (i.e., they examined only one report), and Dahl and Fløttum (2019), who, analogously to Fløttum and Gjerstad (2013), analyse only one corporate report in order to identify linguistic representations in it. As illustrated by the aforementioned examples, it is quite common in research studies on the framing of climate change discourse to operate with only one climate change report. Accordingly, the present study is organised in the wake of prior research (Dahl & Fløttum, 2019; Fløttum & Gjerstad, 2013) that focuses on a single climate change-related report.

In terms of the methodology, the study, as already mentioned, is based upon a qualitative approach to framing (Entman, 1993, 2007; Kapranov, 2017c). In line with Entman (Entman, 1993, 2007), the following methodological procedure was conducted. Firstly, the report was examined manually for the presence of recurring words, phrases and sentences associated with the issue of climate change. Secondly, the report was analysed in the computer program AntConc version 4.0.11 (Anthony, 2022) in order to identify the most frequent words and lexical bundles related to climate change. Thirdly, the report was scrutinised again with the help of the computer-assisted lists of the most frequently occurring words and lexical bundles in order to establish (i) the way the issue of climate change was explicitly manifested by lexical means, (ii) how the issue of climate change was problematised, (iii) how the cause and/or causes of climate change were referred to, and (iv) how the issue of climate change was mentioned in relation to moral judgements and/or evaluation. The results of the qualitative framing analysis are outlined in the following subsection of the article.

Results and discussion. Judging from the results of the framing investigation, the MoD's 2024 report on climate change is framed by eight qualitatively different types of frames. These frames, inclusive of the typical examples that illustrate them, are summarised in Table 2 below.

Table 2. The Framing of the Report and the Associated Examples

#	**Frames**	**Examples**
1	Agility	The need for agility will become more apparent as MOD enters epoch two of the Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach ('minimising and fitting for the future 2026-2035'), which mandates a commitment to exploiting and developing existing technologies at greater scale, and determining use cases for emerging technologies (MoD, 2024, p. 28).
2	Challenge	Climate change presents a systemic challenge to society. This challenge is driving an unprecedented sustainable technology revolution. Participating in this revolution has the potential to improve the agility, resilience and capability of our armed forces. Failure to adopt changes in sustainable technology could leave our armed forces weaker, less agile, less resilient and less capable than our adversaries (MoD, 2024, p.3).
3	Costs	First and foremost is the perception that CC&S represents an additional cost and comes at detriment to operational capability - the primary purpose of defence. Furthermore, the exacting nature of defence equipment means long term development and commissioning cycles inhibit the options for rapid change and alteration. The requirement for certainty, reliance and dependency also restrict experimentation with new technology resulting in the defence industry more frequently being a fast follower in

		integration of emerging technological solutions (MoD, 2024, p.3).
4	Future	The MOD has a need to consider the potential needs and design of the force in 20 and 30 years (rather than traditional five- or ten-year cycles), and the assets that the future force will and won't require. All the effects of climate change are not yet appropriately embedded within planning processes. This could compromise MOD's understanding of the utility or potential redundancy of essential products in different contexts (MoD, 2024, p.4).
5	Green Energy	Geothermal technologies are not weather dependent, increasing the potential for their use in a defence context. Geothermal power plants are considered a 'greener' source of energy, with life cycle emissions reportedly four times lower than solar PV technology, and between 6 to 20 times lower than natural gas, also consuming less water on average than traditional power generation technologies. This highlights the ability to pursue both competitive advantage and advantage denial in an operational context, whilst also realising significant reductions in defence emissions without additional effort. There remains an opportunity to explore how UK defence can sustain operations beyond energy production by using generated energy as an asset. Energy produced could be transferred or even sold to national grids (MoD, 2024, p.10).
6	Mitigation	Therefore, mitigating climate risk in defence infrastructure and exploiting associated opportunities is essential to ensure that future deployments can be sustained within their operating environments (MoD, 2024, p.12).
7	Risk	MOD bases within the UK face a range of climate-related risks, including rising sea levels threatening naval bases, rising temperatures affecting airfield runway requirements, and potential storm damage to firing ranges (MoD, 2024, p.11).
8	Technology	Additionally, defence purchases of climate-relevant technologies could strengthen geopolitical relationships by adding value to the resources of partner nations and contributing to their industrialisation (MoD, 2024, p.14)

Before we discuss the frames in Table 2 in more detail, two important observations should be made. The first observation consists in the fact that all the frames in Table 2 share the view of climate change as a critical problem, which the British national and international defence sectors must address. In other words, and in unity with Entman (Entman, 1993, 2007), the problem definition in all eight types of frames in Table 2 is identical, i.e. it is represented by the issue of climate change as a security problem. The second observation, which follows from the first one, is that all the frames in Table 2 are embedded into the construal of security, which, in accordance with Entman (1993), can be argued to represent a common way to evaluate the issue of climate change in all the aforesaid frames. In this light, the major difference among the frames in Table 2 consists in the manifestation of the proposed remedies and solutions associated with the tackling of climate change within the context of security. Put differently, we may also consider all the frames in Table 2 as partaking in the megaframes Climate Change and Security, respectively, which exhibit different approaches to the solutions associated with the negative consequences of climate change.

Now, let us discuss the frames in Table 2 from the vantage point of differences in the proposed solutions in relation to the issue of climate change and, concurrently, situate our discussion within the existing body of research on the framing of climate change in the UK's security contexts. First of all, let us draw our attention to the group of frames that could be argued to represent the most evident and self-explanatory nexus between the issues of climate change and security, namely the frames Challenge and Risk. The presence of these frames in the report lends support to the studies conducted by Boas (2015), Boas and Rothe (2016), and Warner and Boas (2019), who contend that climate change is problematised as a challenge to global and national security, particularly, in the UK. Furthermore, the present findings are in line with Kapranov (Kapranov, 2024a, 2024b), who has discovered that the issue of climate change is routinely framed as Risk by King Charles III.

Interestingly, the framing of climate change as a challenge and risk to the UK's national security in the report involves a respective stock of clusters,

which are evident from the computer-assisted analysis of the report in AntConc (Anthony, 2022). In the frame Challenge, these clusters can be illustrated by the following examples: Challenge to defence; challenge to society; challenge for the UK defence; and challenge to the defence sector. In the frame Risk, they can be exemplified by such clusters as risk assessment; risk for defence bases; risk from the effects of wind; risk in defence infrastructure; risk posed by ongoing climate change; and risk to sea level rise.

Another group of closely related frames in the report involves Costs, Future, and Mitigation. Seemingly, they are united by the need to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change in relation to not only the current defence situation, but to the decades ahead. Obviously, the future planning of measures associated with climate change mitigation requires substantial resources and an increase in investment in order to implement them. Notably, the frames Costs and Mitigation, respectively, are found in the literature on the framing of climate change in the UK (see Harrington, 2023; Kapranov, 2024a, 2024b; Matthews, 2017; Peters, 2018). However, the frame Future seems to be absent in the findings reported by the literature (Boas, 2015; Boas & Rothe, 2016; Chmutina et al., 2018; Harrington, 2023; Kapranov, 2024a, 2024b; Matthews, 2017; Peters, 2018; Warner & Boas, 2019). Presumably, the presence of the frame Future in the report can be accounted by the MoD's long-term planning of measures that pertain to the issue of climate change. In this regard, let us illustrate the frame Future by some of the clusters that are associated with this frame, which are further given in italics, for instance, future and clarify the cost of delaying; future capability and have possible cost implications; future climate risks in the countries; future deployments can be sustained; future force designs especially in logistics; future ground combat capability; future ground combat systems; and future operational capability, to name just a few frequently occurring ones. As mentioned, the frame Future is closely aligned with the frames Costs and Mitigation in the report. This finding is further supported by the word clusters yielded by AntConc (Anthony, 2022), for instance, cost during the experimentation phase; cost efficiency; cost imaging technologies can support; cost implications the role of the sustainability; cost model and costs of adaptation; cost of delaying decisions; and cost saving benefits, which echo the clusters that are associated with the frame Mitigation, particularly, mitigation adaptation improved energy security; mitigation dragonfire laser firing; mitigation general dynamics land systems; and mitigation installation.

We can also see from the aforementioned clusters that the frame Mitigation pertains, inter alia, to the frame Technology. This observation can be exemplified by such clusters as technology developments; technology laboratory; technology requirements and the support; technology revolution; technology to power communication systems; and technology uptake. In its turn, the frame Technology seems to be interconnected with the frame Green Energy, given that technology and, especially, technological innovations, are heavily involved in the development and introduction of renewables and other forms of the so-called "green", i.e. ecologically-friendly, sources of energy. In the report, there are multiple references to such green energy sources, as geothermal, wind, and solar energy. It should be noted that the presence of the frames Green Energy and Technology lends direct support to a number of prior studies (Chmutina et al., 2018; Harrington, 2023; Kapranov, 2024a, 2024b; Matthews, 2017; Peters, 2018), which indicate that the UK's climate change discourses mention a variety of forms of green energy and technological solutions that are required in order to implement them successfully, so that the targets of net zero are met.

Whilst such frames as, for example, Green Energy, are profusely represented in the literature, the frame Agility seems to be specific to the 2024 MoD report on the issue of climate change. To specify this type of frame, we should bear in mind that the report is situated discursively within the co-ordinates of national security that presuppose a swift and timely response to the risks and threats, inclusive of the threat posed by the negative consequences of climate change. Again, this frame is not reported in the prior studies that are outlined in the article. Hence, we may claim that the presence of the frame Agility is a novel finding that appears to be specific to the security-centred climate change discourse by the MoD.

Conclusions. By means of using a qualitative framing methodology developed by Entman (1993,

2007), the present study sought to gain insight into the way the issue of climate change was framed in the MoD's report on climate change published in 2024. The application of the qualitative methodology to the report yielded eight qualitatively different types of frames, namely Agility, Challenge, Costs, Future, Green Energy, Mitigation, Risk, and Technology. It was found that all of the aforementioned frames were discursively situated in the nexus between the issues of security and climate change.

Judging from the findings, the MoD report framed the issue of climate change via the frames that were interrelated or, at least, were indicative of a clear connection between them, which allowed their classification into the following groups: (i) Challenge and Risk, (ii) Costs, Future, and Mitigation, and (iii) Technology and Green Energy. Concurrently, the frame Agility was found to be a stand-alone type of the framing of climate change. Notably, the frames Challenge and Risk, (ii) Costs and Mitigation, and (iii) Technology and Green Energy were reflective of the literature (Boas, 2015; Boas & Rothe, 2016; Chmutina et al., 2018; Harrington, 2023; Kapranov, 2024a, 2024b; Matthews, 2017; Peters, 2018; Warner & Boas, 2019), which reported the presence of similar frames in the British discourses on climate change. However, it was established that the frames Agility and Future could not be discussed in terms of their relationship to the literature on the grounds that they, and especially, the frame Agility, seemed to be a novel finding not previously mentioned in the prior studies.

Given that the issues of security and climate change were at the heart of each of the aforementioned frames, it could be concluded that the British MoD communicated the issue of climate change to the general public and other stakeholders in an open access report that was framed in such a way that it seemed to be aligned with the respective frames by the consecutive British governments, such as the frames Challenge and Risk, Costs and Mitigation, and Technology and Green Energy. At the same time, the frames Future and Agility, respectively, could be argued to manifest a specific feature of the MoD's climate change discourse, which could be reflective of the organisational nature of the MoD that prioritised (i) long-term planning that was evident from the frame Future, and (ii) alertness to the need to react timely to the challenges and risks posed by climate change that was apparent from the frame Agility.

Based upon the present findings, it could be possible to suggest several directions of future research. The first and quite obvious direction could be to collect a corpus of several reports by the MoD and analyse them in conjunction with the issue of climate change. The second direction could involve a comparison of the MoD's report with that of another NATO member in order to establish how the MoD's framing would be different and/or similar to the climate change discourse of that NATO member.

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