

Organisational learning at the National Army Academy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (1991 – 2024): practices, transformations, and lessons

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Abstract.

The article aims to examine the development of organisational learning at the National Army Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Academy) and its critical role and impact on the institution's educational process over the period 1991 – 2024. It highlights the Academy's limited progress in lessons learned analysis and implementation achieved during peacetime (1991 – 2014) and the subsequent adaptation, modernisation, and transformation of learning practices during the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014 – 2024). The study analyses the lessons learned processes in the Academy as a case study in the evolution of organisational learning within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Particular attention is given to transitioning from the Soviet-inherited System of Lessons Analysis and Dissemination to a NATO-compatible Lessons Learned System, demonstrating the progression and remodelling of learning practices in Ukrainian military educational institutions. **The research methodology** integrates general scientific approaches (analysis, synthesis, generalisation) with a historical-systemic method for studying military reforms. **The scientific novelty of the work** lies in a comprehensive study of the Academy's Lessons Learned Capability with particular emphasis on its five core components: organisational structure, process, tools, training, and information sharing. For the first time in Ukrainian academic discourse, the effectiveness of organisational learning within a military educational institution is evaluated through the lens of "absorptive capacity", a conceptual framework widely adopted in Western military scholarship. **Conclusions.** The article's findings demonstrate how the convergence of inherited Soviet models and progressive NATO lessons learned practices has influenced the institutionalisation of learning within the Academy, focusing on key structural and procedural dimensions. The integration of advanced learning methodology and mechanisms has improved the Academy's capacity in officer training, which contributed to the operational adaptability and strategic resilience of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the context of full-scale Russian aggression. These results have practical relevance to enhance the Lessons Learned System of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and its ongoing alignment with NATO standards and procedures.

Keywords: organisational learning, lessons learned process, Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Army Academy, NATO, Russo-Ukrainian War.

Організаційне навчання в Національній академії сухопутних військ Збройних Сил України (1991 – 2024): практика, трансформації й уроки

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Анотація.

Мета статті – дослідити розвиток організаційного навчання в Національній академії сухопутних військ Збройних Сил України (Академія) та його вирішальну роль і вплив на освітній процес у цьому закладі в період 1991 – 2024 років. У роботі висвітлено обмежений прогрес діяльності Академії з вивчення та впровадження досвіду у мирний час (1991 – 2014), та її подальшу адаптацію, модернізацію та трансформацію під час російсько-української війни (2014 – 2024). У дослідженні проаналізовано розвиток в Академії процесів засвоєння та

застосування уроків і передового досвіду як приклад еволюції організаційного навчання у Збройних Силах України. Особлива увага приділяється переходу від успадкованої від радянських часів Системи узагальнення та поширення досвіду до сумісної з НАТО Системи вивчення та впровадження досвіду, що демонструє прогрес і удосконалення практики організаційного навчання в українських військових навчальних закладах. **Методологія дослідження** поєднує загальнонаукові підходи (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) з історико-системним методом вивчення військових реформ. **Наукова новизна роботи** полягає у комплексному дослідженні спроможності військового навчального закладу до вивчення та імплементації уроків з особливим акцентом на її п'яти основних компонентах: організаційно-штатна структура, процес, засоби, тренування особового складу та поширення інформації. Вперше в українському академічному дискурсі оцінено ефективність організаційного навчання у військовому навчальному закладі через призму «абсорбційної здатності», що широко застосовується в західній військовій науці. **Висновки.** Результати статті демонструють, як конвергенція успадкованих радянських моделей і новітніх практик НАТО з вивчення та впровадження досвіду вплинула на функціонування організаційного навчання в Академії, зосередившись на його ключових структурних і процедурних аспектах. Інтеграція передових методологій і механізмів аналізу й імплементації набутого досвіду покращила спроможність Академії у підготовці офіцерів, що сприяло підвищенню оперативної адаптивності та стратегічної стійкості Збройних Сил України в умовах повномасштабної російської агресії. Результати дослідження мають практичне значення для вдосконалення Системи вивчення та впровадження досвіду Збройних Сил України та її приведення у відповідність до стандартів і процедур НАТО.

Ключові слова: діяльність із вивчення та впровадження досвіду (організаційне навчання), процес вивчення та впровадження досвіду, Збройні Сили України, Національна академія сухопутних військ, НАТО, російсько-українська війна.

The problem statement. The importance of organisational learning in military affairs cannot be overstated. Throughout human history, the ability of armed forces to adapt based on their experiences has been a cornerstone of operational and strategic successes. Performing of effective lessons learned (LL) process ensures that the key problems are identified and solved, successes are analysed and replicated, and evolving challenges are met with informed solutions. Knowledge derived from LL and best practices provides a basis for adapting forces, refining training, optimising strategies, and enhancing overall combat effectiveness (NATO, 2022). In warfare, this capability is especially vital, allowing forces to remain more agile and responsive to dynamic battlefield conditions than their adversaries.

However, a critical gap often exists between acknowledging the importance of organisational learning and successfully institutionalising it: “The phrase ‘lessons learned’ has become ubiquitous, yet organisations struggle with developing effective lessons learned processes” (Milton, N. 2010, p. 7). Many military structures face persistent challenges in systematically capturing, validating, disseminating, and implementing knowledge from previous operations. These difficulties often stem from cultural resistance, bureaucratic inertia, the inherent complexity of the military environment, and insufficient personnel awareness and leadership engagement in LL processes (Dyson, T. 2019, pp. 22–24).

Analysis of sources and recent research. Military organisational learning refers to the establishment and systematic application of appropriate lessons learned capability through capturing and analysing observations, producing and disseminating knowledge, and transforming experience into remedial actions aimed at minimizing the risk of repeating mistakes and increasing the chances of success (Dyson, T. 2019; NATO 2022; Pashchuk, Y. 2025). Its core objectives include improving organisational structures, refining doctrines, updating strategies and tactics, and enhancing military education, thereby increasing the adaptability and operational readiness of armed forces (NATO 2022).

The LL capability of armed forces and subordinate entities is grounded in five core components: organisational structure, process, tools, training, and information sharing (NATO 2022, p. 13). According to present scholarly frameworks (Zahra, S. George, G. 2002; Cohen, W. & Levinthal, D. 1990; Dyson, T. 2019), organisational learning, including its dynamic characteristics (knowledge acquisition, management, dissemination, and transformation) and the key components of LL capability, can be assessed using two universal indicators of effectiveness that correspond to the fundamental dimensions of “absorptive capacity”:

1) “Potential absorptive capacity”, which refers to the identification and assimilation of knowledge (experience).

2) “Realised absorptive capacity”, which involves the transformation of acquired knowledge into remedial actions that enhance organisational adaptability.

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The level of these capacities can be evaluated on a five-point scale: very low, low, moderate, high, and very high.

Contemporary academic theories on military organisational learning are largely based on analyses of LL processes derived from expeditionary operations conducted by NATO states in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia (Barno, D. & Bensahel, N. 2020; Dyson, T. 2019; Hoffman, 2021; Van der Vorm, M. 2021). These studies primarily examine how armed forces develop, adapt, and institutionalise LL mechanisms within relatively stable and controlled operational environments. However, a comprehensive understanding of the underlying principles and approaches of organisational learning requires detailed investigation under conditions of high-intensity warfare. Since 2014, Ukraine has been subjected to ongoing military aggression by the Russian Federation, culminating in a full-scale invasion in February 2022. This protracted war has created a unique and urgent context in which the analysis of LL practices within the UAF is both timely and strategically vital. It offers a critical opportunity to test and refine global theoretical models of military learning. More importantly, the empirical insights generated by such research hold considerable practical relevance for strengthening the UAF's LL Capability.

Since 1991, organisational learning within the UAF has encountered significant transformations, primarily through the development of two successive LL systems (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Y. 2022, p. 148, 161). The first, the System of Lessons Analysis and Dissemination (SLAD), inherited from the Soviet Armed Forces, operated from December 1991 to December 2018 and evolved through three phases: "Stagnation" (December 1991 – May 2013), "Reformation" (May 2013 – April 2014), and "Adaptation" (April 2014 – December 2018). The second system, the Lessons Learned System (LLS), was launched in January 2019 as a more advanced and NATO-aligned model, which remains in operation. The LLS retained the foundational logic of SLAD but integrated modern NATO doctrines and best practices, becoming a key component of the UAF's contemporary organisational learning architecture. It has evolved through two distinct phases: "Modernization" (January 2019 – February 24, 2022) and "Transformation" (February 24, 2022 – present).

In this broader context, it is essential to investigate the implementation of LL approaches within specific UAF organisations, with particular attention to the National Army Academy (NAA). Located in Lviv, Western Ukraine, the NAA was established on the foundation of the former Soviet Higher Military Political School. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the institution has undergone substantial structural and doctrinal transformations. Renamed in 2015 as the NAA, named after Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi, it has developed into a principal centre for the Ukrainian Army officers' training, especially through the gradual integration of NATO standards and operational practices in response to Russian aggression that started in 2014. Notably, since that time, the NAA has emerged as a key contributor to the development of organisational learning within the UAF.

Despite its significance, the above-mentioned aspect remains underexplored in Ukrainian academic literature. The LL practice of the Academy represents a unique and underutilised case for assessing the application of modern mechanisms for knowledge acquisition, implementation, and dissemination within the broader context of the Armed Forces' transformation and alignment with NATO standards.

The purpose of the article. This paper aims to provide a historical analysis of the evolution, implementation, and outcomes of lessons learned processes at the National Army Academy, emphasising its dual role as a representative institution and a leading hub of organisational learning development in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The results of the research. The period from 1991 to 2024 in Ukraine includes both a peacetime phase (1991 – 2014) and a wartime phase (2014 – 2024), each marked by the application of distinct learning systems, initially the Soviet-inherited SLAD, followed by the NATO-aligned LL System. Accordingly, the analysis of LL processes at the NAA should be contextualised within these two historical stages and the corresponding trajectories of organisational learning progress.

1. Lessons learned processes at the National Army Academy in peacetime (December 1991 – April 2014).

Between 1991 and 2014, the UAF experienced a prolonged period of institutional stagnation, marked by unjustified reductions in personnel and armaments, as well as limited progress in modernisation. This inertia was particularly evident in the sphere of organisational learning, where the SLAD proved largely ineffective in capturing, processing, and applying insights derived from peace support operations and training activities (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Y. 2022, pp. 148–152).

Before 2014, the UAF lacked a centralised structure for managing LL processes. The existing framework was characterised by the absence of clearly defined responsibilities and inadequate coordination among command-and-control bodies, which significantly hindered the development of learning mechanisms (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Y. 2022, p. 149). Furthermore, no comprehensive regulatory basis was in place to govern the identification, analysis, and dissemination of operational experiences. The semi-formal LL procedures were primarily executed through a 'bottom-up'

submission of observations in the reporting documents, followed by a 'top-down' sharing of generalized LL information. Dissemination mechanisms primarily consisted of printed publications, which were limited in scope, slow to circulate, and typically lacked in-depth analytical content. The minimal use of modern information technologies and the absence of dedicated databases further constrained the accessibility and timely exchange of relevant knowledge. Notably, no LL training was conducted within the UAF during this period, resulting in a general lack of institutional capacity to support adaptive learning processes.

A salient example of these systematic deficiencies was the marginal development of LL processes at the Academy. Following Ukraine's independence in 1991, the NAA inherited not only the personnel and infrastructure of a former Soviet military school but also its doctrinal rigidity, hierarchical command culture, and outdated pedagogical methods. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the Academy operated largely according to Soviet-era standards, with limited responsiveness to evolving security challenges and minimal engagement with Western military approaches. Knowledge derived from real-world experience was not meaningfully integrated into the educational process. While officer training programmes included subjects such as tactics, art of war, and military history, these were often taught descriptively and linearly, lacking critical reflection or systematic engagement with lessons from recent conflicts. In contrast to Western military academies that fostered adaptive thinking, the NAA adhered to former Soviet doctrinal conformity and prioritised the passive transmission of modern war experiences, often derived from ideologically biased Russian sources. Even when the Academy's personnel participated in multinational training and peace support operations, there was no institutional mechanism in place to systematically collect and analyse this knowledge for curriculum development and cadets' education. For instance, officers returning from peacekeeping missions were seldom assigned to lecture and share their experience, to develop updated training modules. Consequently, the valuable operational experience they acquired, including both effective practices and observed shortcomings, frequently remained individualised and informal, with limited institutional capture, analysis, implementation, and dissemination.

It is important to note that between 1995 and 2014, the Yavoriv training area, located approximately 50 kilometres from the NAA, emerged as one of the principal sites for international exercises in Ukraine. In the summer of 1995, NATO forces first arrived at Yavoriv for the "Peace Shield 95" manoeuvres (NDR 2020, p. 44). Since then, most multinational trainings on Ukrainian territory have taken place at this location, with activities prior to 2014 primarily focused on peacekeeping and crisis response operations. As a continuation of the "Peace Shield" series, the "Rapid Trident" exercises have been conducted annually at the Yavoriv training area since 2008. The training area was formally subordinated to the Academy in 2011 (Analiz 2019, pp. 6–27).

The NAA personnel and cadets actively participated in these multinational exercises, gaining valuable experience. Particularly significant was the involvement of NAA officers in NATO LL teams between 2011 and 2013. Their collaboration with counterparts in LL activities during the "Rapid Trident" exercises strongly contributed to the development of the Academy's learning capacity. The insights and expertise gained through these engagements played an important role in further creating and shaping Ukraine's modern LLS, which was introduced in 2019. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that before 2014, the Academy lacked a consistent role in analysing the outcomes of these international exercises.

Thus, the limited and largely symbolic implementation of semi-formal LL procedures at the NAA between 1991 and 2014 reflected the broader stagnation of organisational learning across the UAF during this period. Overall, the Academy's learning trajectory prior to the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014 represents a missed opportunity to develop an adaptive and reflective military education system aligned with contemporary operational demands. No dedicated LL unit was established to manage the LL process, the quality of LL analysis remained low, and the LL cycle exceeded three months (NDR 2020, p. 37; Pashchuk, Y. 2025, p. 245).

As a result, between 1991 and 2014, the Academy failed to institutionalise organisational learning as a core institutional function. Accordingly, the NAA's LL practices during this period can be characterised by a low level of "potential absorptive capacity" and a very low level of "realised absorptive capacity" (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Y. 2022, pp. 159–161). This was particularly evident in the slow, fragmented, and often ineffective dissemination and implementation of operationally relevant lessons and best practices. Moreover, the Academy's inability to develop internal LL mechanisms and to integrate operational experience into its curricula reflected broader deficiencies in the UAF's institutional approach to learning, adaptation, and innovation.

2. Lessons learned processes at the National Army Academy in wartime (April 2014 – December 2024).

2.1. Adaptation of organizational learning (April 2014 – December 2018).

The Russian armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014 acted as a catalyst for the considerable modernisation of organisational learning within the UAF, prompting military leadership to initiate

substantial reforms of the SLAD. By mid-2014, an LL regulatory framework had been improved. Consequently, a centralised LL structure was established in the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone, and the semi-formal LL process was refined through the introduction of standardised LL reports. In late 2017, the UAF launched the Interactive Electronic LL Database (IELLD), which, despite its limitations, remains operational to this day.

The NAA's LL structure underwent corresponding transformations in response to these reforms. Notably, in May 2014, a dedicated LL section was established within the Academy's Army Scientific Centre (ASC), the first LL body within UAF educational institutions. This unit was staffed by two military officers and three civilian experts. Between 2014 and 2018, ASC personnel, particularly from the LL section, played an active role in advancing organisational learning initiatives within both the UAF and the Academy (Vidomosti 2015; NDR 2018). For example, in May 2014, ASC experts initiated the creation of mobile lessons learned teams (MLLTs) to strengthen the UAF's LL Capability. In June 2014, ASC staff developed the first methodological framework for MLLT operations, drawing on best practices from equivalent structures in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (Propozytsii 2014, p. 1–7). The first UAF MLLT, composed of 11 personnel, was formed by the ASC on 17 November 2014 and deployed to the 80th Separate Airmobile Brigade between 25 November and 12 December 2014. Over the following year, ASC staff participated in the deployment of an additional nine MLLTs across six military units (Vidomosti 2015, p. 4–6). The reports produced by these teams were submitted through formal command channels and typically included identified lessons and best practices, training and operational challenges, root cause analyses, and proposed remedial actions. Between 2014 and 2018, MLLTs supported by the NAA contributed numerous valuable recommendations aimed at improving the UAF's operational capabilities (NDR 2018, p. 53–56).

Beginning in January 2015, the ASC was tasked with producing monthly LL bulletins analysing critical combat experiences (NDR 2020). These publications documented valuable insights, particularly those related to the contributions of NAA personnel who participated in the ATO and/or served in MLLTs responsible for collecting and analysing key observations. Drawing on the content of these bulletins, the ASC established the NAA's LL repository and an accompanying digital LL database in January 2018.

In April 2018, for the first time within the UAF, the Academy developed a comprehensive methodology for the collection, implementation, and dissemination of combat experience. Simultaneously, a NATO-aligned organisational LL structure was introduced, which included the appointment of LL Staff Officers (LLSO) and LL Points of Contact (LLPOC) in the Academy's units with clearly defined responsibilities and coordination mechanisms (Nakaz 2018, p. 2–14). The practical outcomes of these initiatives enabled the ASC to formulate high-quality and timely proposals, which were subsequently incorporated into the LL Concept (NDR 2018, p. 44–56), LL Doctrine (Doktryna 2020), and Temporary LL Standard Operating Procedures (Instruktsiia 2020).

Hence, between 2014 and 2018, the NAA demonstrated tangible progress in developing its organisational learning system with notable improvements in three core LL Capability elements: organisational structure, tools, and information sharing. Driven by the operational demands of ongoing warfare, the Academy was compelled to reform both its pedagogical approach and internal procedures for capturing and applying operational lessons. These developments facilitated a more systematic collection, analysis, and dissemination of operational knowledge, particularly through field deployments and structured reporting. The most significant outcome of these reforms was the transformation of the educational process, which increasingly prioritised the effective integration of essential combat experience into cadet training.

However, essential limitations, particularly the continued reliance on the ineffective SLAD model within the broader UAF, hindered further progress in advancing organisational learning at the Academy. The application of improved semiformal LL procedures was limited to the ATO zone, the timeliness of LL information dissemination remained on a three-month cycle, and no personnel training had been initiated (Pashchuk, Y. 2025, p. 245). Moreover, the NAA's educational programmes did not adequately provide future officers with foundational knowledge of the LL processes and sufficiently prepare them in using the principles of organisational learning. Survey data (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Y. 2022, p. 160) also revealed that only 18.9% of NAA personnel were aware of ongoing LL reforms.

Thus, it can be concluded that the Academy's "potential absorptive capacity" improved to a moderate level, while its "realised absorptive capacity" rose to a low level, reflecting initial but meaningful efforts to operationalise and transform obtained knowledge. This gradual progress in organisational learning marked a departure from previous stagnation and laid the foundation for a more adaptive and responsive educational system at the Academy.

2.2. Modernization of organizational learning (January 2019 – February 24, 2022).

Four years of ongoing Russian aggression (2014–2018) revealed an urgent need to significantly enhance the UAF's LL Capability and underscored the necessity of replacing the outdated SLAD with

a more advanced LL System. In response, a comprehensive LL Roadmap was developed in November 2018 and launched in January 2019. It envisaged the formation of a three-tier LL structure, the implementation of NATO LL procedures, and the establishment of LL training courses by December 30, 2019 (Plan 2018, p. 1–4). The creation of an LL Portal to replace the ineffective IELLD was planned by June 30, 2021 (Plan 2018, p. 4), but it has yet to be implemented.

The adoption of the LL Doctrine (Doktryna 2020) and Temporary LL SOP (Instruktsiia 2020) in July 2020 marked a turning point in the institutionalisation of a standardised NATO LL process within the UAF, significantly enhancing organisational learning and achieving greater interoperability with the Alliance (Dyson, T. & Pashchuk, Y. 2022). Importantly, many of the NAA's findings and recommendations served as a foundation for these key doctrinal LL documents. Overall, the Academy's LL activities between January 2019 and February 2022 should be regarded as an intensive phase of critical experimentation, innovation, and targeted implementation of NATO best practices. Notably, the pilot experiment involving the application of NATO LL procedures during the "Rapid Trident 2019" exercise confirmed their effectiveness and supported their subsequent adoption across the UAF in 2020 (Analiz 2019, pp. 6–27; Doktryna 2020, p. 25). This approbation demonstrated that Ukrainian personnel were capable of rapidly and adequately acquiring the competencies necessary to implement the formal LL process.

It is particularly important to highlight that, for the first time in the history of the UAF, the NAA conducted three LL courses in 2021, training a total of 82 officers:

1) The LL course involving a NATO Mobile Training Team (May 18–20, 2021): 25 LLSOs and 18 LLPOCs.

2) The first national LL course (June 14–18, 2021): 11 LLSOs and 8 LLPOCs.

3) The second national LL course (October 18–23, 2021): 8 LLSOs and 12 LLPOCs.

As a result of the learning reforms implemented at the NAA between 2019 and 2022, the quality of LL analysis significantly improved, and the average duration of the LL cycle was reduced to approximately two months (Pashchuk, Y. 2025, p. 245). Key factors contributing to these improvements included:

The introduction of the Electronic Document Management System in mid-2018.

The expansion of the Academy's LL organisational structure.

The increased deployment of Mobile Lessons Learned Teams (MLLTs) from the NAA.

The initiation of LL training courses.

The effective implementation of the NATO formal LL process, particularly its ODCR (Observation, Discussion, Conclusion, Recommendation) analytical model (NATO 2022, p. 27).

Consequently, the Academy's organisational learning during the analysed period can be assessed as demonstrating a high level of "potential absorptive capacity" and a moderate level of "realised absorptive capacity." This indicates that while the NAA institution has developed robust LL mechanisms for acquiring, processing, and storing knowledge, the full integration and practical application of this knowledge across all levels of training and operations remains in progress. These gains had a direct and positive impact on the educational process at the institution. The lessons learned and best practices were more rapidly and systematically integrated into training programmes, resulting in a more adaptive and context-responsive curriculum. The cadets' exposure to current combat experience and evolving operational requirements fostered critical thinking, enhanced tactical awareness, and better prepared junior officers for deployment in dynamic and complex operational environments.

2.3. Transformation of organizational learning (February 24, 2022 – 2024).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 placed significant pressure on the national LL System due to a sharp rise in combat observations and the need for rapid, high-quality analysis. In response, the UAF strengthened LL bodies at the strategic level in March 2022 and expanded and unified them at the tactical and operational levels in April 2023. The structure and functions of MLLTs were overhauled to improve analytical speed and depth, with a substantial increase in both their number and responsibilities. In 2023, LL training was reorganised through mobile training teams, and by early 2024, hybrid formats combining in-person and remote courses were introduced. These reforms improved LL performance significantly, reducing the average time to disseminate operational experiences to approximately one month (Pashchuk, Y. 2025, p. 247).

As part of these efforts, the Institutional LL System (ILLS) at the Academy was created and comprehensively modernised by the end of 2024. Its primary function is to systematise the collection, processing, implementation, and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices, support NAA's MLLT activities, and provide LL training for the UAF personnel. Developed using both NATO standards and internal innovations, the ILLS comprises six subsystems:

1) Educational Subsystem – Integrates lessons and best practices into the educational process. Since February 2022, over 300 course programmes and nearly 500 methodological guides have been developed and updated based on operational experiences.

2) Scientific Subsystem – Applies lessons and best practices to research and doctrine development. Between 2022 and 2024, LL inputs supported 76 research projects and 150 operational studies. Monthly analytical LL bulletins are produced by the Academy and distributed within the NAA and to Land Forces units.

3) Management Subsystem – Oversees and coordinates NAA's LL activities. Annual orders of the Academy's Commandant assign LLSOs and LLPOCs across structural departments, outlining roles and coordination procedures.

4) Information Support Subsystem – Manages the secure handling, storage, and dissemination of both classified and unclassified LL materials. A regularly updated Moodle-based internal database supports this effort. Since February 24, 2022, the NAA has processed over 300 LL documents.

5) Advisory Subsystem – Facilitates collective decision-making through LL working groups to enhance consistency and quality in organisational learning (NATO 2022, p. 16).

6) LL Training Subsystem – Delivers LL training to UAF personnel. Since 2021, over 20 courses (in-person, mobile, and online) have been conducted, training more than 400 service members.

The use of the modernised and transformed ILLS has significantly enhanced organisational learning at the Academy. Its effectiveness is best reflected in a very high level of “potential absorptive capacity” and a high level of “realised absorptive capacity”. As a result, cadets' training has become closely aligned with the realities of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Updated course syllabi and classroom instruction, delivered by qualified combat instructors, place a strong emphasis on current battlefield experience, integrating the latest lessons identified and learned, along with best practices from the front lines. Cadets are exposed daily to both positive and negative cases from Ukraine's armed resistance against Russian aggression. This includes information on:

The dynamics of modern combat operations, characterised by intensity, fluidity, surprise, and rapidly shifting battlefield conditions.

Offensive and defensive operations under constant unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), electronic warfare, and counter-battery threats.

Widespread use of UAVs, electronic warfare tools, communication systems, automated command and control platforms, and combat information systems.

The growing role of firepower, including integrated artillery, rocket systems, and UAV strikes.

The extensive deployment of explosive obstacles (up to 40 km in depth), heavily fortified defensive structures, and related infrastructure.

Throughout cadets' training, emphasis is placed on preserving personnel and equipment, as well as exploring, testing, and applying new, asymmetric, and unconventional approaches to defeating the enemy.

A key current institutional trend to prepare highly qualified instructors is the regular deployment of all NAA servicemen to combat zones, where they perform operational tasks and subsequently submit LL reports through the chain of command for thorough analysis by the Academy's LLSOs and LLPOCs. It is also important to highlight that, primarily due to the enhanced quality and timeliness of the formal LL process, NAA personnel quickly and effectively mastered a wide range of both domestic and foreign weapon systems and military vehicles provided by international partners. This has enabled the Academy to prepare future officers to operate and employ these systems at a high level, critical for strengthening UAF operational capabilities and achieving NATO interoperability. Compared to previous years, the use of innovative training technologies, such as modern adaptive simulators, virtual reality and augmented reality platforms, and immersive learning systems, has significantly increased, making cadet training more aligned with battlefield realities.

Although LL training for UAF personnel has been conducted at the Academy since May 2021, significantly enhancing organisational learning within both the NAA and the UAF, low awareness of LL processes among Ukrainian servicemen remains a critical issue. To address this, in 2024, the Academy became the first Ukrainian military educational institution to introduce a dedicated course to familiarise future officers with the structure and methodology of the LL process.

Conclusions. Based on a historical analysis of the evolution of organisational learning at the National Army Academy between 1991 and 2024, it is evident that this practice underwent limited development over the peacetime (1991 – 2014), followed by its progressive adaptation, modernisation, and transformation into a robust Institutional Lessons Learned System during the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014 – 2024). This conversion integrated both internal innovations and global best practices, resulting in a substantial enhancement of all five core components of LL Capability (organisational structure, process, tools, training, and information sharing), significant increases in both potential and realised absorptive capacities, and an approximate 2.5-fold acceleration of the learning cycle (Pashchuk, Y. 2025, p. 247). The Academy has also played a leading role in developing and implementing the NATO formal lessons learned process and methodologies, as well as in cultivating a modern learning culture across the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Despite this progress, organisational learning at the Academy still requires further improvement to meet current demands. Key priorities include enhancing the quality of combat experience analysis, increasing personnel awareness of learning principles, promoting broader involvement in the lessons learned process, and strengthening the leadership's role in institutional learning. These efforts are essential to improve the training of Ukrainian Army officers and enhance their adaptability to the challenges of modern warfare.

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