The Leningrad nuclear power plant Accident (1975) in the context of the Chernobyl preconditions

Abstract

The purpose of the study is to reconstruct and analyze a set of issues related to the accident at the Leningrad NPP in the context of clarifying the prerequisites of the Chernobyl disaster. Our study examines issues related to the accident at Unit 1 of the Leningrad NPP (LNPP) in 1975. This is the largest accident in the «pre-Chernobyl» period, a precursor to Chernobyl. This topic remains ignored in domestic historical scientific literature. The article by the co-authors, based on published sources, mostly memoirs, attempts to highlight a number of aspects related to the accident at the Leningrad NPP. The research methodology is based on a combination of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, historical-comparative) methods with the principles of historicism, systematicity, scientificity and verification. The scientific novelty of the work lies in the fact that the development of aspects related to the problems of the history of nuclear energy in the USSR is almost not studied in domestic historical science. In this regard, in particular, the study of the prehistory and prerequisites of the Chernobyl disaster is important. Conclusions. It was established that the design of the RBMK-1000 reactor and other technological systems of the power unit were far from perfect. It has been established that the design of the RBMK-1000 reactor and other technological systems of the power unit were far from perfect. It is shown that the process of improving the reactor installation took place during installation and operation, including through various experiments. The available sources to a certain extent make it possible to reconstruct the causes, prerequisites, nature and circumstances of this accident. First of all, it is found that the accident revealed serious shortcomings of the RBMK-1000 reactor. The article highlights the socio-economic and human factors of the accident. In particular, it is shown that at Soviet nuclear power plants the policy of prioritizing the plan for generating electricity over the requirements of regulatory documents for the safe operation of the reactor dominated. A similar phenomenon occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP). Based on the sources, it was possible to clarify the key role in creating the accident of a certain person, namely the senior reactor control engineer Mikhail Karrask. Our study also pays attention to covering the work of the special commission to investigate the accident. In this regard, it was particularly important to understand whether information about the nature of the accident and the commission's recommendations on improving the operation of the RBMK-1000 reactor reached the attention of the personnel of other nuclear power plants, primarily the Chernobyl NPP.