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Abstract
The article aims to provide a historical and analytical overview of the development of organisational learning in the German Armed Forces from 1914 to 2024. The study covers four key periods: the First World War (1914–1918); the formation of the Reichswehr (1919–1935); the interwar and wartime evolution of the Wehrmacht (1935–1945); and the transformation of the Bundeswehr within NATO’s collective defence framework (1955–2024). The research methodology combines a heuristic approach with a historical reconstruction of the examined events. The source base includes scholarly and military publications, NATO doctrinal documents, and informational materials. The study applies a historical-systemic analysis of lessons learned capability based on a retrospective examination of its seven basic components: four “pillars” (organisational structure, process, tools, and personnel training); a key element (information sharing); and the foundational layer (mindset and leadership). The scientific novelty lies in the integrated comparative analysis of over a century of the German organisational learning model, including the identification and in-depth examination of its core components. The research highlights the main characteristics of institutional resilience and continuity within the German military organisational culture, which have ensured its capacity for systemic adaptation, innovation, and inheritance of best practices. Conclusions. The military-historical analysis of learning practices in German military organisations revealed key institutional and structural transformations, enabling an assessment of their effectiveness and alignment with contemporary approaches. The findings have practical and scholarly significance, providing a methodological foundation for enhancing the NATO-compatible Lessons Learned System of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The recommendations developed in the study can be applied to improve doctrinal documents, knowledge-management processes, and learning culture.
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